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The prevailing doctrine of fair com-
ment has been stated in a leading case'
as follows:
"There Is no doubt that the public
acts of a public man may lawfully be
made the subject of fair comment or
criticism, not only by the press, but by
all members of the public. But the dis-
tinction cannot be too clearly borne In
mind between comment or criticism
and allegations of fact, such as that
disgraceful acts have been committed
or discreditable language used. It is
one thing to comment or criticize, even
with severity, the acknowledged or ap-
proved acts of a public man, and quite
another to assert that he has been
guilty of particular acts of miscon-
duct. In the present case the appel-
lants, in the passages which were
complained of as libelous, charged the
respondent, as now appears, without
foundation, with having been guilty of
specific acts of misconduct, and then
proceeded, on the assumption that the
charges were true, to comment upon
his proceedings in language in the
highest degree offensive and injurious.
Not only so, but they themselves
vouched for the statements by assert-
ing that, though some doubt had been
thrown upon the truth of the story, the
closest investigation would prove it to
be correct. In their lordships' opinion
there Is no warrant for the doctrine
that defamatory matter thus published
is regarded by the law as the subject
of any privilege."
Among other English and American
cases laying down the same general doc-
trine is the leading Illinois case, Rearick
v. Wilcox2 . In this case the Illinois court
said:
"While the qualification and fitness
of a candidate for office might prop-
erly be discussed with freedom by the
press of the country, we are aware of
no case that goes so far as to hold
that the private character of a person
who Is a candidate for office can be
destroyed by the publication of a
libelous article in a newspaper, not-
withstanding the election may be at-
tended with that excitement and feel-
Ing that not unfrequently enters into
our elections... The law required ap-
pellee, as the publisher of a journal, to
publish facts, and not libelous articles.
The character and reputation of appel-
lant was as sacred, and as much en-
titled to protection, when a candidate
for office, as at any other time... It
may be true that appellee supposed,
In the publication of the article In
question, he was doing a meritorious
act to the public. But, however that
may be, it would be establishing a
dangerous rule to hold that the pro-
prietors of the press might, whenever
they thought the public good required
it, defame the character of the citizen.
The law has given them no such pow-
er, and where its exercise Is attempted
it must be at their peril."
The Illinois doctrine of fair comment
and privilege as applied to criticism of
public officials has been briefly stated'.
"The claim is next made that the
publication of the article was priv-
ileged, as the criticism was directed
against public officials. Public con-
duct of all public officers is a matter
of public concern and may be made the
subject of fair and reasonable criti-
cism, but the privilege does not ex-
tend to false and defamatory state-
ments imputing criminal offense or
moral delinquency to the officer In the
discharge of his official duties."
I Davis v. Shepstone, L. R. 11 App. Cas.
187, 190. This passage from Lord Chan-
cellor Herschell's judgment is quoted with
approval by U. S. Circuit Judge Taft in
Post Pub. Co. v. Hallam (1893). 59 Fed. 530,
8 C. C. A. 201, and by Justice Holmes in
*Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of
Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co (1891),
154 Mass. 238, 242, 28 N.E. 1, 13 L. R. A. 97.
Rearick v. Wilcox (1876) 81 Ill. 77 81.
" The People v. Fuller (19d9), 238 Ill. 116,
125; Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77.
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In a more recent Illinois case, the
court holds that a candidate for a public
office is considered as submitting his
character in issue only so far as It may
respect his fitness and qualifications for
the office sought, and that while every
one may freely comment on his conduct
and actions it is not the right, privilege
or duty of a newspaper publisher to de-
fame the candidate, and that to a mali-
cious publication of libelous matter
against such candidate there is no de-
fense on the ground that it is privileged
nor that it is mistakenly and honestly
made. The court said:
"It is not the privilege or duty of
one publishing a newspaper to publish
libelous matter against any candidate
for public office. Such person has no
more right or privilege in that regard
than any other person in the same
community. The liberty of free speech
and of free press is the same in that
regard. When' any one becomes a
candidate for a public office, conferred
by the election of the people, he Is
considered as putting his character in
issue, so far as it may respect his fit-
ness and qualifications for office, and
every one may freely comment on his
conduct and actions. His acts may be
canvassed and his conduct boldly cen-
sured. But the publication of false-
hood and calumny against public offi-
cers or candidates for such offices is
an offense most dangerous to the
people and the subject of punishment,
because the people may be deceived
and reject the best citizen, to their in-
jury. An intention to serve the public
good in such a case cannot authorize
or justify a defamation of private char-
acter. Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77;
Sweeney v. Baker, 13 W. Va. 158, 31
Am. Rep. 757; Jones v. Townsend's
Adm'x, 21 Fla. 431, 58 Am. Rep. 676.
To a malicious Publication of libelous
matter against a candidate for public
office there is no defense on the ground
that it is privileged, and it is not a de-
fense that it is mistakenly and hon-
estly made. Such matters go only in
mitigation of damages."
Distinctions in Fair Comment
In a consideration of the Illinois law
of fair comment, the general question
arises as to what is understood by the
SOgren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.(1919). 288 Ill. 405, 417, 123 N. E. 587, 592.
term, fair comment. Inasmuch as the
courts of the several states have differed
fundamentally in their interpretation of
the term as applied in their decisions,
the matter of the various distinctions
made in the use of the term and in its
meaning in the applicable law is im-
portant. A consideration in general of
the doctrine of fair comment in the law
of libel will conduce to a better compar-
ative deduction of the Illinois law of fair
comment. For this purpose It is con-
sidered advisable to set forth the views
of some of the representative legal
writers on the question, with especial
reference to the different theories and
' fundamental distinctions.
There are two main theories as to the
principle upon which the defense of fair
comment is founded. The one is the
theory that the defense of fair comment
is a branch of the defense of qualified,
or conditional, privilege; the other is the
theory that fair comment is a distinct
defense in that the writing in behalf of
which it is interposed is not a libel, bu,
is only rightful comment-an expression
of fair opinion, proper for any one to
express, as was done In the writing in
question. These two theories basically
underlie the respective interpretations of
the. doctrine of fair comment as enun-
ciated by different courts in their varying
decisions. An excellent exposition Is
that of Mr. Francis R. Y. Radcliffel in the
excerpt herewith quoted:
"What is the principle upon which
the defence (of fair comment) is
founded, and what are the limits of
its application?
"As to the first point there are two
rival theories. The one is that ex-
pounded by the Court of Common
Pleas (Willes, Byles, and Brett, JJ.) in
Henwood v. Harrison (1872) L. R. 7 C.
P. 606. The Court there says (at p.
622): 'The principle upon which these
cases are founded is an universal one,
that the public convenience is to be
preferred to private interests, and
that communications which the inter-
ests of society require to be unfettered
may freely be made by persons acting
honestly without actual malice, not-
$Mr. Francis R. Y. Radcliffe, 23 LawQuart. Review, 97 (1907).
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withstandinh that they involve relevant
comments condemnatory of individuals.'
And the Court therefore came to the
conclusion (at p. 625) 'that the fair
ind honest discussion of, or comments
upon, a matter of public interest is in
point'of law privileged, and that it is
not the subject of an action, unless
the plaintiff can establish malice.' In
other words, the Court in that case
held that the defence of 'fair com-
ment' is merely a branch of the de-
fence of 'qualified privilege' in the
ordinary sense.
"The rival view was first expounded
by Blackburn and Crompton, JJ., in
Campbell v. Spottiswoode (186.3) 3 B.
& S. 769, 32 L. J. Q. B. 185. and has
since received the adhesion of the
Court of Appeal in Merivale v. Carson
(1887) 20 Q. B. D. 275. In the first
of these cases, Blackburn, J., puts the
matter thus: 'I think it of considerable
consequence to bear in mind that the
case is not one of privilege, properly
so called, but the question is whether
the article complained of is a libel or
not.' And Crompton, J., says: 'The
first question is libel or no libel, which
is for the jury; and they have* to say
whether the writing complained of goes
beyond fair comment: if it does not
it is no libel.'...
"What then would be the logical
solution of the matter? That the true
basis of the defence of 'fair comment'
is that laid down in Henwood v. Harri-
son, and not that laid down in Camp-
bell v. Spottiswoode and Merivale v.
Carson. Both Blackburn, J., in the
former case, and Bowen, L. J., in the
latter, distinguish the defence of 'fair
comment' from that of 'privilege,' prop-
erly so called, by saying that the latter
is the peculiar right of a particular
individual under particular conditions,
a true privilegium; while 'fair com-
ment' is the right of every member of
the public. With the greatest deference
to the opinion of these two great law-
yers, is that distinction sound? It may
possibly be correct as regards what is
known as 'absolute privilege'-the
privilege of a Member of Parliament,
a Judge upon the Bench, and the like.
But is not 'qualified privilege' the equal
right of all the world? It is the oc-
casion which is privileged and not the
man. very one has an equal right to
use defamatory language in giving the
character of a servant, in making com-
plaint of a subordinate to his superior,
and the like. It does not depend upon
his position in life, or upon his being
a member of any particular class. It
is based solely upon public utility. It
is hard to see any logical distinction
between the defence of 'fair comment'
and that of 'qualified privilege' in the
ordinary sense. It is to the public ad-
vantage that public matters and the
actions of public men should be fully
and freely discussed, and, therefore,
although in such discussion defama-
tory language may be used, it is priv-
ileged. The 'occasion' which gives rise
to the 'privilege' is the discussion of
matters of public importance, and of
those alone: in which sense the priv-
ilege is limited by the 'occasion' Just
as any other kind of 'qualified privi-
lege.' The true view would therefore
seem to be that the decision in Hen-
wood v. Harrison is right-that 'fair
comment' is only a form of 'qualified
privilege,' and that proof of actual
malice will do away with the protec-
tion which would otherwise prevail.
But how? Surely not by importing a
kind of defamatory flavour into that
which would otherwise not be defama-
tory, but on a different principle. Cer-
tain occasions justify the use of
defamatory words, but on public
grounds alone. If a man tries to make
use of the occasion as a "cloke of ma-
liciousness,' he forfeits the special
protection which he would otherwise
enjoy, because the raison d'dtre of his
defamatory statement is not a bona
fide exercise of a public right, but a
desire to gratify his private spite."
The view that the defense of fair com-
ment imports that the alleged actionable
words are not defamatory of the plaintiff
and are not libelous because the stricture
is not made upon his personal character
but impersonally upon his work, was ex-
pressed by Justice Deemer in an opinion
of the Iowa Supreme Court', from which
we quote:
"It is sometimes said that fair and
honest criticism in matters of public
concern are privileged, but there is a
manifest difference between fair and
honest criticism of public events and
privileged communications. In the
latter case the words may be defama-
tory, but the defamation is excused or
justified, by reason of the occasion
while in the former case the words
are not defamatory of the plaintiff, and
are not libelous-the stricture or crit-
icism is not upon the person himself,
but upon his work. In other words, It
is Impersonal. Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me.
521, 34 Atl. 411, 51 Am. St. Rep. 446;
Ott v. Murphy (1913), 160 Iowa, 730, 141 N. W. 463, 467.
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Burt v. Advertising Co., 154 Mass. 288,
28 N. E. 1. 18. L. R. A. 97. Criticism
must be founded on truth, and false
statements or attacks. on private char-
acter are not permitted. Clifton v.
Lange, 108 Iowa,. 472, 79 N. W. 276;
Fry v. Bennett, 5 Sandf, (N. Y.) 54;
Haynes v. Clinton Ptg. Co., 169 Mass.
512, 48 N. E. 275."
The distinction between fair comment
as a special privilege of the press and
fair comment as the right of every one,
not the privilege of any particular one,
the distinction between privileged com-
munications Justifying defamation by
reason of the occasion and fair comment
as not defamation of the plaintiff and
hence not libelous because the stricture
is not upon the person himself but upon
his work, and the further distinction that
if the comment is privileged, then,
strictly, the plaintiff would in every case
be required to prove actual malice while
the defendant would only have to prove
that he honestly believed the charges'he
made, and that this is not the law of fair
comment, are set forth in an opinion by
Chief Justice Ostrander, of the Michigan
Supreme Court', from which we quote as
follows:
"In making the defense of fair com-
ment, defendant had no benefit of
'privilege,' in the sense in which the
learned trial judge used the term in
advising the jury; no privilege at-
taches to a newspaper in such a case,
and the liberty of the press, unless
affected by statute, is no greater and
no less than the liberty of every citi-
zen. McAllister v. Free Press Co., 76
Mich. 338, 43 N. W. 431, 15 Am. St. Rep.
318; Bee Pub. Co. v. Shields, .68 Neb.
750. 94 N. W. 1029, 99 N. W. 822. Al-
though some eminent judges have used
the word 'privilege' to describe the
public right of fair comment (Gray, J.,
in Gott v. Pulsifer, 122 Mass. 235, 238,
239, 23 Am. Rep. 322), bona fide com-
ments on matters of public interest are
not privileged; because it is the right
of every one, not the privilege of any
particular one, to comment fairly and
honestly on any matter of public inter-
est, and the defense of fair comment
Is equally applicable whether the crit-
icism be oral or written. One distinc-
tion between fair comment and priv-
Ileged communications is that in the
latter case the words may be defama-
tory, but the defamation exhused or
justified by reason of the occasion,
while in the former case the words
are not defamation of the plaintiff,
and hence not libelous; the stricture
is not upon the person himself, but
upon his work-upon what he has said
or has written. Another. distinction is
that if criticism or comment is priv-
ileged, strictly, the plaintiff would in
every case be required to prove actual
malice, however false and however in-
jurious the strictures, while the de-
fendant would only have to prove that
he honestly believed the charges he
made: and this is not the law."
"The onus is on plaintiff where a
defense of fair comment is raised, just
as in any other case, to show that the
words are reasonably capable of being
understood as a libel on him, and it is
for the judge to say whether the pub-
lished article is capable in law of be-
ing a libel (McQuire v. Western Morn-
ing News Co., 2 K. B. 100. 111 (1903),
and the court having determined this
point 'favorably to the plaintiff, then
whether the words complained of are
or are not fair comment is essentially
a question for the jury (Campbell v.
Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 778. 32 L. J.
R. Q. B. 185; Merivale v. Carson. 20
Q. B. Div. 275).
"'Fair comment does not negative
defamation, but establishes a defense
to any right of action founded on de-
famation.' Per Buckley, L. J., in Peter
Walker v. Hodgson, 1 K. B. 239, 253
(1909). 'It is precisely where the
criticism would otherwise be action-
able as a libel that the defense of fair
comment comes in.' Per Lord Lore-
burn, L. C., in Dakhyl v. Labouchere, 2
K. B. 325, 327 (1908). See Cooper v.
Stone, 24 Wend. (N. Y.) 434; Dowling
v. Livingstone, 108 Mich. 321, 66 N. W.
225. 32 L. R. A. 104. 62 Am. St. Rep.
702; Newell on Slander and Libel (3d
Ed) c. 20; Fraser's Law of Libel and
Slander (5th Ed.) art. 24."
"Clearly, the court was in error in
instructing the jury that there was in-
volved any question of 'qualified priv-
Ilege,' in the sense in which the court
used the term, and in advising them
that plaintiff must prove express
malice in order to recover. Quite as
clearly, the court was not in error in
refusing to charge, as requested to do
by the plaintiff, that the only question
for the jury was the damages sus-
tained by the plaintiff. The jury should
have been instructed that the article
in question is libelous unless it is fair
7Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co.(1918). 203 Mich. 570, 170 N. W. 93, 99-100. Arrangement of order of paragraphs.quoted is the writer's.
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comment, and that whether or not it
is fair comment was for them to de-
cide, under instructions to be given
them. If it was fair comment, plaintiff
could not recover; if it was not, the
rules to be applied in respect to the
measure of recovery are those applic-
able to any other case of libel."
The view that comment upon given
facts otherwise libelous, may assume a
privileged character when founded on
facts not in themselves libelous by rea-
son of its being comment which any one
has a right to make upon a public man,
was thus remarked by the English Chief
Justice Cockburn:$
"It is true that a comment upon
given facts, which would otherwise be
libelous, may assume a privileged
character, because, though unjust and
injurious, yet being founded on facts
not in themselves libelous, it is a com-
ment which any one is entitled to make
upon a public man. For instance, sup-
pose that any one states facts not in
themselves libelous of a candidate for
election to parliament, and on them
bases the conclusion that he is not an
honest politician. The comment may
be injurious, but it may be privileged
as a fair comment on the facts, if not
malicious, because made on a public
man. On the other hand, to say that
you may first libel a man, and then
comment upon him, is obviously ab-
surd."
Another English judge briefly re-
marked the distinction between fair com-
ment and libelous misstatements of fact',
and stated the essential of a plea of fair
comment, as follows:
"Comment, in order to be fair, must
be based upon facts, and if a defend-
ant cannot shew that his comments con-
tain no misstatements of fact, he
cannot prove a defense of fair com-
ment. The usual way to begin such a
plea is by asserting that the facts on
which the comment is based are true,
that is, that the defendant has made
no misstatements in formulating the
materials upon which he has com-
mented. If the defendant makes a
misstatement of any of the facts upon
which he comments, it at once nega-
tives the possibility of his comment
being fair. It is therefore a necessary
part of a plea of fair comment to shew
that there has been no misstatement
of facts in the statement of the mate-
rials upon which the comment was
based."
The limitation of real comment to
merely the expression of opinion based
upon accurately stated conduct or fact,
in contrast to the misdescription of fact
or conduct as a false picture presented
for Judgment, was defined in an Austral-
ian case"0 , as follows:
"The error which is usually com-
mitted by those who bring themselves
within the law of libel when comment-
ing on conduct is in thinking that they
are commenting when in point of fact
they are misdescribing, Real comment
is merely an expression of opinion.
Misdescription is a matter of fact. If
the misdescription is such an unfaith-
ful representation of a person's con-
duct as to induce people to think that
he has done something dishonorable,
disgraceful and contemptible, it Is
clearly libelous. To state accurately
what a man has done, and then to say
that in your opinion such conduct is dis-
honorable, or disgraceful, is comment
which may do no harm, as every one
can judge for himself whether the
opinion expressed is well founded or
not. Misdescription of conduct, on the
other hand, only leads to one conclu-
sion detrimental to the person whose
conduct is misdescribed, and leaves the
reader no opportunity of judging for
himself of the conduct condemned,
nothing but a false picture being pre-
sented for judgment."
In an English case", the court has
stated a summation of the law of fair
comment in three principles, viz., (1)
that the comment must bear on its face
Its character of comment only and show
plainly that it is not so intermixed with
statement of fact that the reader cannot
Judge between what is report and what
is comment, (2) that the writing must
give a true statement of existing facts
in order to warrant a plea of fair com-
ment, and (3) that it must contain no
unwarranted imputations of evil from
the truly stated premises:
"The law as to fair comment...
stands as follows: (1) In the first
place, comment in order to be Justifi-
able as fair comment must appear as
comment, and must not be so mixed
0 Cockburn, C. J., in Queen v. Carden 10 ChrIstie v. Robertson (1889), i0 New
(1879). 5 Q. B. D. 1, 8. S. Wales L. R. 157. 161.9 Collins, M. R., in the Court of Appeal. 1 1 Per Fletcher Moulton, L. J., in Hunt v.in Digby v. Financial News (1907). 1 X. B. Star Newspaper Co. (1908), 2 K. B. 309.502, 507.
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up with the facts that the reader can- so
not distinguish between what is report th
and what is comment... Any matter, th
therefore, which does not indicate w
with a reasonable clearness that it br
purports to be comment, and not state- inj
ment of fact, cannot be protected by the th
plea of fair comment. (2) In the next pr
place, in order to give room for the cu
plea of fair comment, the facts must op
be truly stated. If the facts upon no
which comment purports to be made ioi
do not exist, the foundation of the at
plea fails... (3) Finally, comment In
must not convey imputations of an ou
evil sort except so far as the facts re
truly stated warrant the imputation... WE
To allege a criminal intention or a ho
disreputable motive as actuating an m
individual is to make an allegation of MA
fact which must be supported by ade- se'
quate evidence." vii
pr
Perhaps the law of fair comment may su
be considered as undergoing a general ta
growth and gradual development in this
country, many of its features being anal- te
ogous to or borrowed from the English ca
doctrine of fair comment which itself has in
been developed largely within the past m
fifty years. In reviewing the general in
principles of the English and American ba
law regarding the defense of fair com- cg
a
ment Judge Van Vechten Veeder, in his ar
"Freedom of Public Discussion
'
, a pro- te
found consideration of the principles of itep
the whole subject, has ably developed the it
fundamental distinctions in the law of co
fair comment, from which we quote the siis
following statement of the principles of m
the applicable law relating to the element in,
of malice negativing fair comment as le
defense, the questions of the burden of thw
proof, and the questions of law and of su
fact, the differentiation in the views of lo
the English and the American law on the fa
criticism of personal conduct, and the th
criticised distinction between different fa
an
kinds of imputation: ge
"If comment conforms to the forego- lic
ing requirements the critic brings him- w
self prima facie within the immunity. on
But the occasion exists for a well-de- w
fined public purpose, and if the plaintiff ir
can prove that the defendant, although In
prima facie within the immunity, was by
nevertheless using the occasion for th
REVIEW
me ulterior and improper purpose, he
ereby displaces the immunity, and
e defendant is liable, just as he
ould have been if he had never
ought himself within the right. Hav-
g regard to the reasons for which
e occasion exists, the most obvious
oof for this purpose would be cir-
mstances tending to show that the
inion expressed in the comment was
t the defendant's genuine opin-
n; or that he had no opinion
all on the subject of the com-
ent, or otherwise published it with-
t any belief that it was Just, and in
ckless indifference as to whether it
as Just or unjust. If, however, such
nest belief in the justice of the com-
ent existed in fact, it is wholly im-
aterial whether, in an intellectual
nee, it was sound or unsound, con-
rcing or irrational, unless it can be
oved by independent evidence that
ch belief, though genuinely enter-
ined, was itself created by malice.
"It is obvious, therefore, that the
rm 'fair,' as used in the English
ses, merely excludes those elements
hich prevent the comment from fall-
g within, or take it out of, the im-
unity arising from the occasion. But
so far as facts are assumed as the
sis of the criticism, or untrue alle-
tions of fact are introduced in the
urse of it, or personal imputations
e made not arising out of it, the pre-
nded criticism is not criticism at all.
is not a question of its title to the
ithet 'fair,' or to any other epithet;
does not answer to the description of
mment, and is defamation pure and
mple. Where, on the other hand, it
proved by the plaintiff that the com-
ent, though on the face of it answer-
g to the description, was neverthe-
ss the expression of an opinion which
e critic did not in fact entertain or
Ls otherwise actuated by malice, it is
fficient to say that the protection Is
st; there is no occasion to speak of
irness or unfairness. Everything
at is involved in the rule prescribing
irness, would equally be contained in
y rule which, omitting the term alto-
ther, simply prescribed that the pub-
iation of any defamatory matter
hich is wholly and solely comment
the 'public conduct or published
ork of another is the subject of an
imunity defeasible only on proof of
alice. It is clear that what is meant
'fairness' is neither more nor less
an the absence of malice, and the
12 Van Vechten Veeder, "Freedom of Pub-
lic Discussion," 23 Harvard Law Review(1910). 413, 428-8, 431-4. In quoting these
masterly passages, interspersed footnote re-
ferences except last one are omitted.
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burden being on the plaintiff to allege
and prove the existence of malice, as
well as the fact that it prompted the
comment, and not on the defendant to
allege and prove its absence, or to
negative any suggestion that his com-
ment was actuated thereby, the use of
a positive word in connection with
comment is seen to be not only un-
necessary, but most deceptive, inas-
much as it imports the necessary pres-
ence of an affirmative quality as the
condition of immunity, whereas it is
the existence and influence of its op-
posite which is the necessary condi-
tion of that immunity being displaced.
"On a plea of fair comment the bur-
den is on the defendant to prove all
the facts necessary to bring the case
within the foregoing requirements. He
must satisfy the court that the sub-
ject of the comment is a matter of
public importance, and must establish
that the matter, on its face, is com-
ment, unadulterated with any of those
alien elements which are sufficient to
prevent its coming within the province
of fair comment. If the plaintiff de-
sires to show that the prima face im-
munity, innocent as it appears to be
on the surface, was in fact actuated
by malice, the burden is on him to
prove this. Whether the subject is one
of public interest, and whether there
is any evidence of the defamatory mat-
ter constituting or not constituting fair
comment, are questions of law. All
other issues in relation to a plea of
fair comment are questions of fact."
* * * * * * "Whatever uncertainty may
characterize some of the intervening
cases, it is now established by recent
English cases that 'a personal attack may
form part of a fair comment upon given
facts truly stated if it be warranted
by those facts; in other words, if it
be a reasonable inference from those
facts. Whether the personal attack in
any given case can reasonably be in-
ferred from the stated facts upon
which it purports to be a comment is
a matter of law for the determination
of the Judge before whom the case is
tried; but if he should rule that this
inference is capable of being reason-
ably drawn, it is for the jury to de-
termine whether in that particular
case it ought to -be drawn.'
"In this country the weight of ju-
Is "Howarth v. Barlow, 113 N. Y. App.
Div. 510; McDonald v. Sun Printing & Pub.
Co., 45 N. Y. Misc. 441; Reade v. Sweetzer,
6 Abb. Pr. n. s. 79, n.; Hart v. Townsend, 67
How. Fr. 88; Eickhoff v. Gilbert. 124 Mich.
353; Dunenback v. Tribune Printin Co., 108
Mich. 75; Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 583;
dicial dicta is undeniable contrary to
the English view. In the majority of
the cases commonly cited in this con-
nection no distinction between com-
ment and statement of fact is made or
involved in the actual determination.
They are, almost without exception,
cases involving direct statement as dis-
tinguished from comment; or, if in-
volving any comment at all, no basis
for the comment was proved, and
privilege was claimed simply by vir-
tue of the occasion being a matter
of public interest. These cases are
not, therefore, in opposition to the
English rule, for they were not cases
of comment properly so called, and
privilege would have been equally de-
nied under that rule. They are simply
authority for the rule that a direct
statement of fact is not privileged by
reason of the publicity of the occasion.
The difficulty is that these decisions
have generally gone beyond the actual
issue, and, often using the term 'crit-
icism' as synonymous with derogatory
statements of fact, have expressed the
dictum that criticism is privileged, or
not actionable, so long as it does not
attack the private character of the per-
son criticized, or impute evil motives.
In other words, while the actual de-
cision is generally unimpeachable, the
foundation is delusive, i. e., a distinc-
tion between different kinds of imputa-
tion, whereas the true distinction is be-
tween comment and statement of fact.
While this doctrine recognizes some
latitude in the discussion of matters of
public interest, its practical futility is
shown by the conflicting and some-
times fanciful ideas of the sort of im-
putations which are held to fall within
it. But this doctrine, so far as it is
intelligible, would seem to leave little,
if any, more practical freedom In the
discussion of matters of public inter-
est than that which is permitted In the
discussion of the conduct of a private
person. It leaves the law" very much
in the attitude of saying, 'You have full
liberty of discussion, provided, how-
ever, you say nothing that counts.'
"Other and more carefully considered
cases are in substantial agreement
with the prevailing English doctrine.""2
The law of fair comment Is of rather
modern development'. Ordinarily, com-
McBee v. Fulton, 47 Md. 403; Smith v. Hig-
gins, 16 Gray (Mass.), 251; Burt v. Adver-
tiser Newspaper Co., 164 Mass. 238; Mertens
v. Bee Pub. Co. 5 Neb. (Unofficial) 592."14'Wason v. Walter (1868), L. R. 4 Q. B.
73, 93.
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ment or criticism is not actuated by a
personal sense of duty but Is a voluntary
expression of opinion'5 . Freedom of com-
ment Is more in the nature of a right
which is possessed by everyone to ex-
press his own opinion upon matters
of public interest or public welfare",
than in the nature of either a duty or a
privilege. If a matter be a legitimate
subject of public opinion, then It Is one
for the rightful expression of individual
opinion thereon. Such subjects are those
relating to the conduct and qualifications
of public officers, or candidates for office,
legslatiye proposals, governmental poli-
cies, and the merits of literary, artistic
or commercial productions, offered to the
public". The subjects of fair comment
have been classified'3 , as follows: "1.
Affairs of State. 2. The Administration
of Justice. 3. Public Institutions and
Local Authorities. 4. Ecclesiastical Mat-
ters. 5. Books, Pictures and Architect-
ure. 6. Theatres, Concerts and other
public entertainments. 7. Other Appeals
to the Public." Necessarily, any such
classification is not exclusive, but is
mainly broad and suggestive.
Comment Is any remark or criticism
or note or observation intended to ex-
plain, illustrate, or criticize the meaning
of a book or writing'. It is thus, by a
step, applied also to the criticism of the
acts or sayings of a public officer or other
public man. Criticism, as applied in the
law of defamation, is any censure or'
stricture upon the conduct or character
or utterances or official acts of the per-
son criticized". It is thus an expression
of opinion upon facts upon which differ-
ences of opinion may properly arise'.
Fair comment, as the term Implies, is
such expression of opinion upon a matter
of public affairs as Is rightfully and fairly
made. It is comment made upon given
facts, truly stated, in a matter of public
concern, without malice. When so made,
It is only in the exercise of a constitu-
tional right which all persons have to
so express their opinions upon such sub-
jects of legitimate public concern, in-
terest, or welfare22.
However, the right, as indicated, is not
unqualified, but is limited to its exercise
in good faith and without malice toward
the persons concerned or criticized, or
who may be affected by the result of the
comment-. There is a distinction be-
tween comment and defamation. While
fair comment is not strictly defamation,
it is said that it does not necessarily
negative defamation and that it may es-
tablish a defense to a right of action
founded on defamation "4 . If the bounds
of fair comment have not been exceeded
in the expression of opinion upon mat-
ters of public interest and legitimate pub-
lic concern, the defense of fair comment
is available in such case although the
same expressions would be libelous if
they were made upon matters which are
not legitimate subjects of public discus-
sion -'. Generally speaking, the latter
class of subjects are such falling within
the scope of private affairs, private busi-
ness, or conduct of private citizens -'.
The modern or latter tendency of the
15 Link v. Hamlin, 270 Mo. 319, 193 S. W. 1863); Merrey v. Guardian Pub. Co.. 79
587; Cook v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326, N. J. L. 177, 184, 74 At!. 464 (1909): Bing-
145 S. W. 480. ham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27, 33, 96 N. E.
10 Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 51 Am. St. 84, (1911); Const. U. S., I Amendment;
Rep. 446, 34 AtI. 411; Cherry v. Des Moines Const. of 1870 (Ill.), Art II, Sec. 4.
Leader. 114 Iowa. 298, 86 N. W. 323, 54 L. 28 Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521. 51 Am. St.
R. A. 855, 89 Am. St. Rep. 365. Rep. 446, 34 AtI. 411; 36 C. J. Libel and
' Burdick, The Law of Torts, (4th, Stud. Slander, J 288, p. 1283; Const. of 1870 (Ill.),
Ed., 1926), 1 342, p. 398. Art II, Sec. 4.
Is Odgers, Libel and Slander (5th Ed.), 24 Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, 34 AtI. 411;
p. 206. 51 Am SR446; Triggs v. Sun Prtg. etc.
"9Webster, Int. Dict. Assoc., 179 N. Y. 144, 71 N. E. 739, 66 L.R.
20 Belknap v. Ball, 83 Mich. 583, 588. 47 A. 612; Merrey v. Guardian Prtg, etc., Co.,
N. W. 674, 21 Am SR622, 11LRA72; Okla- 79 N. J. L. 177, 74 Atil. 464; Campbell v.
homa Pub. Co. v. Kendall (Okla.), 221 P. Spottiswoode, 3 B. & S. 769- Peter Walker
762; 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, § 277, p. & Son Ltd. v. Hodgson (1909), 1 K. B. 239;
1279. Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203
21 McDonald v. Sun Prtg. etc. Co., 45 Mich. 570, 170 N. W. 93, 36 C. J., Libel aid
Misc. (NY) 441, 92 NYS 37; Oklahoma Pub. Slander, § 278, p. 1279.
Co. v. Kendall (Okla.), 221 P. 762, 36 C. J., 'Merrey v. Guardlin Pub. Co., 79 N. J
Libel and Slander, J 277, p. 1279. L. 177, 184, 74 Atil. 464 (1909).
22 Blackburn, L. J. In Campbell v. Spottis- 26 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, 1 283, notes
woode, 3 B. & S. 769, 32 L. J. Q. B. 185 9, 10, p. 1281.
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law has been to erect In fair comment a
distinct defense to a charge of libel
rather than to retain fair comment as a
form of conditional privilege. While
many courts have not closely marked the
line of distinction, these two grounds of
defense, viz., fair comment and privilege,
are distinct in their very nature and in
their practical application".
The defense of privilege implies im-
munity given to particular individuals by
reason of the peculiar circumstances to
say defamatory things, although the
things said may not be true in fact. Fair
comment, on the other hand, is the right
enjoyed by all persons and each alike to
speak freely, and even with severity,
without liability, upon subjects of legiti-
mate public discussion, although their
opinions may be wrong but honest and
fair and reasonable2s.
The defense of privilege or conditional
privilege relates to the Immunity granted
by the occasion to the utterance of de-
famatory words in the statement of facts.
The very occasion gives an immunity to
the statement of facts although they may
not be true. Fair comment, on the other
hand, is limited to an expression of opin-
ion concerning facts which must be true
and must be truly stated. The right to
so comment upon facts of legitimate pub-
lic concern gives an immunity to the
expression of opinion, although such ex-
pression of opinion may reflect upon per-
sons responsible for the facts, and al-
though such opinion, in the judgment of
others (as a jury), may be unsound or
unwarranted by the actual facts. How-
ever, it is implicit in fair comment that
this defense cannot avail if there be un-
true statement as to a matter of fact
involved in the comment itself".
In the case of privileged communica-
tions, the words may be defamatory of
the plaintiff but the defamation is excused
by reason of the occasion even when they
are not true, while in the case of fair com-
ment the objectionable words are not re-
garded as defamatory of the plaintiff' .
This is because in the case of real fair
comment the facts actually exist, and the
criticism is based on them. In that sense,
fair comment is somewhat analogous to
the defense of justification on the ground
of the truth.
In its practical application, if the de-
fense of fair comment were a form of
conditional privilege, strictly, plaintiff
would in very case be required to prove
actual malice, however false and injur-
Ious the strictures, while defendant would
only have to prove that he believed the
charges he made; and that is not the
lawn.
The recognition accorded the defense
of fair comment as distinct from the de-
fense of conditional privilege is said to
be now perfectly clear and well settled,
and is thus further stated by a writer In
a recent text*2:
"1* * * When a defendant sets up
the defense of conditional privilege he
asserts and must prove that he stands
in such a relation to the facts of the
case, that he is justified in saying pr
writing what would be slanderous or
libelous in any one else. When his de-
fense is fair comment, he asserts that
he has done only what every one has a
right to do, and that his utterance is
not a libel, or slander, and would not
be a libel or slander by whomsoever
published. To quote from a New Jer-
sey decision: 'Comment of this kind
is not privileged by reason of the oc-
casion. What is really meant is that
fair and bona fide comment-and crit-
icism upon matters of public concern
Is not libel, and that the words are not
defamatory.' "
Illinois Law of Fair Comment
Legal writers have considered the
27 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, § 280, zen v. Daily News Co., 203 Mich. 570, 170
notes 95, 96, p. 1280. N.W. 93.
2s Burdick, The Law of Torts, § 341, P a Van Lonkhuyzen v. Daily News Co., 203
397. Mich. 570, 170 N.W. 93; 36 C. J., Libel and
29 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, § 280, cases Slander, § 280, notes 1 and 2, p. 1280.
cited in notes 97, 98, 99. p. 1280; Christie a2Burdick, The Law of Torts, (4th Ed.,
v. Robertson, 10 New S. Wales, 157; Van 1926), § 341, p. 897; Merrey v. Guardian Pub.
Vechten Veeder. "Freedom of Public Dis- Co., 79 N. J, L. 177, 184, 74 Atl. 464 (1909).
cussion," 23 Harv. Law Rev., 413, 424. Accord: Diener v. Star-Chronicle Pub. Co.,
90 36 C. J., Libel and Slander, § 280, note 232 Mo. 416, 132 S.W. 1143 (1910): Cook v.
99, p. 1280; Ott v. Murphy, 160 Iowa, 730, Pub. Co., 241 Mo. 326, 857, 145 S.W. 489
141 N. W. 463; Bearce v. Bass, 88 Me. 521, (1912); Bingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27,
34 Atl. 411; 1 Am SR, 446; Van Lonkhuy- 33, 96 N. E. 84 (1911).
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American law of fair comment, in the
great majority of our states, to be in a
very confused, unsatisfactory, and unde-
veloped condition, especially with regard
to the decisions of many of the courts in
not making or observing the distinctions
between comment and statement of fact
on the one hand, and between fair com-
ment and conditional privilege on the
other. These two fundamental distinc-
tions, and various other distinctions prop-
erly to be drawn in a logical develop-
ment of the law, have remained very
largely confused, and while the courts
in their administration have arrived at
correct results more often than they have
in logical development of the proper prin-
ciples, it would seem that they have
mainly left much to be desired and at-
tained in the matter of proper develop-
ment and sound policy in the law of
lbeln .
In commenting on an Illinois Supreme
Court decision rendered in a libel case
in 1919"', a writer in the Illinois Law Re-
view", after discussing points on the
matter of the applicability of the defense
of justification to a part of the defama-
tory matter where divisible from the
rest, and on the constitutional intent of
the defense of truth in civil suits, called
attention to the insufficient distinctions
in the Illinois law of fair comment as
well as the similar condition in other
states. In writing on that part of the
decision with reference to the absence
of any right or privilege of a newspaper
publisher to publish libelous matter
against a candidate for public office", he
said:
"Due to the fact that the defense of
'fair comment' has not yet been clearly
distinguished from the defense of
'privilege' in this state, a third situa-
tion is likely to present itself, namely,
where an article may be divided into
libelous statements which are true, and
fair comment thereon. Strictly this sit-
uation should be governed by the rule
that a defendant need plead the truth
only of that part of an article which
is libelous, as matters of opinion are
not so. As may be seen by the opinior
in the Ogren case however, fair com-
ment seems to be regarded as a kind
of privilege." * * 0
"Finally, some criticism may be
made of the Supreme Court's discus-
sion of fair comment and privilege in
relation to statements about candidates
for public office or other public men.
The law of Illinois, and indeed the
law of practically all the American
states, has been and is still in a very
unsatisfactory and confused state in
regard to this branch of libel and
slander. It is to be regretted that we
have not yet been accorded the clear
and logical treatment given the sub-
ject by the English cases as summar-
ized and analyzed In Odgers on 'Libel
and Slander' (5th ed., chap. 8). The
only cases in Illinois which deal even
indirectly with the question are as
follows: Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill. 77;
Cerveny v. Chicago Daily News Co.,
139 Ill. 345; People v. Fuller, 238 Ill.
116 (141 Ill. App. 374): La Monte v.
Kent, 163 Ill. App. 1; Sullivan v. Ill.
Publishing and Printing Co., 186 Ill.
App. 268,
"In none of these cases Is 'fair com-
ment' properly distinguished from
'privilege,' nor, in fact, are statements
of fact properly distinguished from
statements of opinion."
On the defense of justification in a
case wherein an alleged libelous article
may be divisible for purposes of defense,
and of a further analogous applicability
of a defense of fair comment in certain
cases, this writer, in partu, said:
"It is difficult to ascertain how this
question was before the Supreme
Court, for, as stated in the paragraph
of the court's opinion immediately pre-
ceding the above excerpt, there were
no demurrers to the defendant's spec-
ial pleas. Inasmuch as the points on
which the Supreme Court seems to
have reversed the Judgment (which
was for the defendant in the trial
court) have to do with whether the
articles complained of were libelous
per se, whether parts of the articles
were spoken of the plaintiff, whether
they were within the bounds of fair
comment, and finally whether certain
88 Van Vechten Veeder, "Freedom of Pub-
lic Discussion," 23 Harvard Law Review(1910) 413, 416-419, 432, 433, 439; L. G. C.,
14 Illinois Law Review (1919), 226, 228,
231, 232.
84 Ogren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.,
288 Ill. 405, 123 N. E. 587.
35 L. G. C., 14 Illinois Law Review (1919),
226.8
oOgren v. Rockford Star Printing Co.,
288 ill. 405, 417, 123 N. E. 587, 692; L. G. C.,
14 Illinois Law Review (1919), 226, 228,
231 282.
af L. G. C., 14 Illinois Law Review (1919),
226, 227.
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evidence was erroneously admitted, it
would seem that the above may be re-
garded as obiter dictum.
'It will be noticed that the only au-
thority cited by the court is Ruling
Case Law, which on examination
shows that its statement of the law
is supported by very scant authority.
There are no Illinois cases in point.
The Illinois law on the question may
be summarized very briefly. Where a de-
fendant denies the publication of part
of an alleged libelous article, it is
clearly settled in this state that he
need justify only that part of which
he admits the publication, and need not
plead or prove the truth of the rest:
Cloidt v. Wallace, 56 Ill. App. 389; Sie-
gel v. Thompson, 181 Ill. App. 164.
"Also it seems clear that a defend-
ant need justify only such parts of an
alleged libelous article as are libelous:
Dowie v. Priddle, 216 Ill. 552. Logic-
ally this same reasoning should extend
to the case where the article com-
plained of consists of libelous state-
ments and fair comment thereon; the
defendant should be required to prove
the truth only of the libelous state-
ments and to be allowed to avail him-
self of the defense of fair comment as
to the rest, for statements of opinion
as distinguished from statements of
fact are not to be considered libelous,
if fair: Odgers, 'Libel and Slander,'
5th ed., p. 202.
"On the other hand it is. probably
settled law that if a libel is not divis-
ible or separable into distinct charges,
and if the defendant admits the pub-
lication of the whole, he cannot justify
as to part: Gault v. Babbitt, 1 Ill,
App. 130; Rice v. Aleshire, 72 Ill. App.
455; O'Malley v. Ill. Pub. & Pr. Co., 194
Ill. App. 544; Harbison v. Shook, 41
111. 141."
A 'search of the cases decided in the
Illinois Supreme Court, discloses that the
doctrine of fair comment has not been
much considered or discussed, nor fully
developed. This may be due largely to
the condition that in but few cases, in
general, is there any question of fair
comment, as a distinct defense, fairly
raised or presented to the court for its
determination. Another reason has been
suggested that, like in many other states,
while actually unimpeachable decisions
have been made for individual cases they
3S 28 Harvard Law Review, 413, 419 n.
3, 423 n. 1, 432 n. 2. 433 nn. 1, 2 434, n 1.
6 "Cooper v. Lawrence et al., 204 Ill. App.
1 1nner v. Illinois Pub. and Prti. Co..
have been placed upon grounds making
a distinction between different kinds of
imputation, whereas the true distinction
is between comment and statement of
factu. Furthermore, it would seem, that
there are no such cases making a clear
distinction between fair comment as a
special defense and that of privilege.
On the other hand, the Illinois Appel-
late Court, in a case first heard before
it on questions of pleadings onlyn, and
afterwards, a jury trial having been had,
upon assignments of error involving the
question of fair comment", has notably
applied the doctrine of fair comment in
the particular case then under considera-
tion. While the decisions of the Appel-
late Court" are not the final or determin-
ative formulation of the Illinois law of
fair comment, there is therein revealed
a careful consideration of the subject and
it is submitted that the well-considered
opinion of this court Is, In general, indi-
cative of the law of fair comment in
Illinois. In the case then under its con-
sideration, the court, in its first opinion' -,
distinguished fair and reasonable com-
ment from false statement of fact, stat-
ing further that "the subject of reason-
able comment and fair criticism must be
a fact and not a libel." The court made
clear its distinction between fair com-
ment and statement of fact in the follow-
ing language:
"Fair and reasonable comment and
criticism upon the acts of Judicial of-
ficers, which are matters of public con-
cern, are allowable, and are sometimes
called 'privileged.' The right to make
and publish such reasonable comment
and criticism, however, does not extend
so far as to permit false statements
of facts and the subject of reasonable
comment and fair criticism must be a
fact and not a libel." ...
"The office of judge is considered by
many as one of the most important in
the community. It is, of course,
unique, unlike all others; it deals only
in the administration of Justice, upon
which Is dependent, in part at least,
the peace of the community. Of course
all are free to speak and publish the
truth of the courts and judges; and
218 Iil. App. 95 (1920).
"Cahill's Ill, Rev. Statutes. ch. 37, g 49,
§ 17. 42 204 Ill. App., 261, 204, 267 (1917).
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reasonable comment upon and fair
criticism of what they have done is to
be encouraged; but a false statement
of fact concerning a judge may be pub-
lished only at one's peril. 'It is one
thing to comment upqn or criticize,
even with severity, the acknowledged
or proved acts of a public man, and
quite another to assert that he has
been guilty of particular acts of mis-
conduct.' Quoted with approval by Mr.
Justice Holmes in Burt v. Advertiser
Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 288; People
v. Fuller, 238 Ill. 116; 1 Starkie on
Slander 118; Rearick v. Wilcox, 81 Ill.
77; Robbins v. Treadway, 25 Ky. 540;
Triggs v. Sun Prtg. Pub. Co., 179 N. Y.
144; Commonwealth v. Clap, 4 Mass.
163."
The court indicated its adherence to
the view that fair comment Is not libel
as distinguished from the view that fair
comment is a kind of conditional privi-
lege, saying":
"It is our opinion that where the
words charged constitute fair criticism
and are privileged (using the word
'privilege' in its popular sense) only
as fair criticism, that the words
charged are then admittedly not libel-
ous, and that the plea of the general-
issue is sufficient." * * * "The fact that
pleas two, three, and four are allowed
to stand will not affect the defense,
because, with or without them. the de-
fendant is entitled to his endeavor to
prove that the words charged are fair
criticism, that is, do not in and of
themselves constitute a libel."
Again, in its second opinion in the
same case", rendered three years later,
the court clearly drew the distinction be-
tween fair comment and statement of
fact, recognizing the defense of fair com-
ment as one to be pleaded especially, in
proper practice. The court said:
"We also stated as a principle of
the law of libel that 'the subject of
reasonable comment and fair criticism
must be a fact and not a libel'; that it
must be the truth and not falsehood.
And, in discussing certain pleadings,
although we intimated that the de-
fendant would be entitled to an en-
deavor to prove that the words charged
were fair comment and did not in and
of themselves constitute libel, we only
intended by that'to announce a general
rule and did not mean that, where the
alleged comment and criticism is based
upon that which in untrue, it may still
be put in as defense. Purther, we in-
timated that fair comment ipight be
put in evidence under the general is-
sue, but, it would seem to be proper
practice to plead that defense espe-
cially."
In its recognition accorded the ever
prevailing influence and increasing power
of the press upon our civilization, the
court drew the protective corrolary of
the limit of its right in making fair
comment' to the publishing of the truth
without malice":
"The press is the most important single
psychological influence in our civiliza-
tion and determines, at least in part,
the conscious thinking and will and
conduct of a great multitude of people.
Wielding such power and given by the
Constitution the right to utter the
truth with impunity, still, in the inter-
est of organized society, that authority,
under the guise of fair comment, should
not be allowed unjustly to assail the
integrity of the bench. And, so, it is
the law, that, although publishing the
truth, without malice, carries with it
immunity from prosecution, publica-
tion of that which is false entails lia-
bility."
On the point of proper foundation
stated in fact as to the trial record of
the plaintiff judge as the subject for the
predicating of fair comment thereon, so
that the reader could himself make his
own inferences and draw his own con-
clusions in determining whether the pub-
lished comment was reasonable, instead
of in merely giving to the reader what,
in effect, was a series of dogmatic state-
ments, the Illinois court drew a funda-
mental distinction recognized in the doc-
trine of fair comment, viz., that of the
distinction between comment upon. given
facts and the direct assertion of facts.
The court said":
"It will be observed that facts con-
stituting the trial record of Judge
Cooper are not set forth in the par-
ticular text which constitutes the libel-
ous words of the second count; and it
follows that any one reading that par-
ticular publication would naturally as-
sume that the injurious statements
therein made were considered to be
sufficiently proven by certain extrinsic
4 204 Ill. App., 261, 268 (1917).
"2 218 Ill: App., 95, 101 (1920).
'5 218 Ill. App. 95. 101, 102 (1920).
'4218 Ill. App.. 95, 105, 106 (1920); 23
Harv. Law. Review 413 419-422; 36 C. J.,
Libel and Slander, § 286, p. 1282.
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facts known to the publisher. It is not
as if the article in question had recited
what purported to be the trial record
of Judge Cooper and had .then pro-
ceeded, by way of inference and deduc-
tion, to make comment thereon, for in
such a case the reader of that publica-
tion would then be able himself to
make inferences and deductions and
so determine whether the comment
which was actually published was rea-
sonable. In the article in question .the
reader is merely presented with what.
in effect, is a series of dogmatic state-
ments. He is given no opportunity to
weigh and balance; he is told bluntly
that Judge Cooper is unfit. It may
well be said that some of the words and
phrases are, technically considered, in
the nature of comment upon what is
implied in other words in the same
publication and that the facts and such
comment are so intermingled that it is
difficult to disassociate them one from
the other. In such a case perhaps the
best test is to consider what thoughts
the reading of those words would
naturally give rise to in the mind of
the average person."
With regard, to the question of sub-
mission to the jury of a controverted
article for its determination as to
whether it be fair comment, the court
ruled in accordance with the accepted
doctrine that such determination is a
question of law for the court":
"It is strenuously contended by
counsel for the defendant that the trial
court should have submitted the article
in question to the jury to determine
whether it was fair comment and crit-
icism. In Parsons v. Age-Herald Pub.
Co., 181 Ala. 439, 61 So. 345, the court
said: 'Whether the libel complained
of may fall within this rule of privi-
lege is a question of law for the court,'
etc. Further, in the same opinion, the
court said in regard to a certain charge
which had been made, 'As matter of
law, it falls outside of the scope of
comment and criticism, as we under-
stand their field of operation,' etc. In
Patten v. Harper's Weekly Corporation,
93 N. Y. Misc. 368, 158 N. Y. S. 70, the
court said: 'If the charge were true as
laid, it would be open to the defense of
justification but if asserted to be com-
ment. its appropriateness as such
should be dealt with as a question of
law.' In Bingham v. Gaynor, 141 N. Y.
App. Div. 301, the court said: 'Whether
the bounds of fair criticism have been
exceeded or not is a question of law
for the court.'
"Applying the foregoing principles
we are of the opinion that the words
charged in the second court are, as a
matter of law, statements of fact and
not comment, and that unless proven
to be true they are actionable: and.
further, that the trial court should not
have submitted to the jury any part of
the article in question to determin,
whether or not it was fair comment.
In regard to the burden of proof iL
case the words are libelous per se and
are, in part, statements of fact, the court
consistently holds that there can be no
defense of fair commenta:
"It is our opinion that the plaintiff
was bound to prove the publication of
the words and then, having done that,
inasmuch as we are of the opinion that
the words are libelous per se, the
burden was upon the defendant to in-
troduce evidence to show that they
were true, and, that being so, it fol-
lows that the defendant was not en-
titled at the close of the plaintiff's evi-
dence to a directed verdict on the
ground that the plaintiff had not prov-
en that the words of the libel were
false. Inasmuch as the words charged
are, in part, statements of fact, and
those words are libelous per se, there
can be no defense of fair comment and
criticism."
Conclusions
In a study of a subject fraught wit
complexity in a jurisdiction for which it
is desired to deduce an accurate state-
ment of law, an avoidance of dogmatic
conclusions has been the policy of the
writer. To this end, the presentation
has been concretely set forth in extracts
of flavor from original sources, as seemed
proper. This study of the subject as pre-
sented, it is thought, may warrant the
conclusions of the writer in a field
wherein others have been afforded prem-
ises for drawing their own conclusions.
The writer's conclusions are therefore
briefly submitted.
In the former presentation of the sub-
ject, the fact "as been sufficiently ad-
verted to that the law of fair comment In
Illinois, as well as in the several states,
HA 218 Ill. App., 95, 106, 107 (1920)- 23 Law Review, 413, 427; 37 C. J.. Libel and
Harv. Law Review, 413, 427, 428; 37 6. J. Slander, 501, p. 85, §1 546, 547, pp. 100,
Libel and Slander, 3 654, p. 108. 101, 54, p. 108.
"8218 I. App. 95, 116 (1920); 23 Harv.
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has been in a state of fluxion or in one
of undergoing a gradual development.
The opinions and pronouncements of
both the supreme and appellate courts in
Illinois may be considered as not having
resulted in even a comparatively fixed
doctrine of the law of fair comment in
Illinois, and this condition is the common
one throughout many of the several
states. In some of the more eastern
states, notably Massachusetts, New York,
New Jersey, Michigan, and others, ad-
vanced ground has been taken upon
which there has been a notable tendency
to erect thereon the doctrine of fair
comment as it has logically developed In
the law of England. However, the de-
velopment in Illinois has been such as to
clearly indicate the recognition of the
doctrine of fair comment as a distinct
defense in libel. The courts may extend
the doctrine to an ultimately fixed policy
of law In the state, or they may recede
from ground seemingly attained. The
prior decisions may control the future
cases in a conservative application of
former principles announced to new
cases as they arise, or the courts may
more largely base their opinions upon
the growing authorities in this line from
other jurisdictions.
However, there is such a thing as too
conservatively to estimate, or to limit
dogmatically, the application of the prin-
ciples indicated in the decisions, even
when their meaning is not necessarily
circumscribed by their very terms. The
true meaning may be found within the
spirit and in the implications permissible
aside from a too literal Interpretation of
the principles announced. With this
thought and in this light, the decisions
in Illinois may be read as a developing
policy of law, and conclusions are not
necessarily limited by the lack of abso'
lute statement In particular cases. Ap-
plying his own views as to the applica-
tion and meaning of the whole course of
decisions In Illinois,- and particularly
with reference to the Illinois cases here-
tofore referred to and quoted from here-
in, the writer submits his deductions as
to the Illinois law of fair comment.
As naturally to be expected, the appli-
cation of the principles has arisen espe-
cially with reference to candidates for
public office, public officers, and other
public men. While freedom of public dis-
cussion of fitness and qualifications" Is
not to be denied, yet the public interest
In the occasion does not justify either
any citizen or the publisher of any news-
paper to transcend the sphere of liberty
allowed by defaming the candidate or
public person, or by casting unwarranted
imputations and aspersions upon his
private character. Newspaper publishers
have the same rights as other persons
In this regard, and no more. The public
man has the same protection to his
private personality and character as has
any other citizen. His views as publicly
expressed by him, his acts and his con-
duct with reference to his public status.
may be freely discussed, commented
upon, and censured even severely, and
for any such criticism there Is a complete
defense both in the justification as truth
for the statement of facts and In the
freedom afforded fair comment upon
given facts.
The public man's private character Is
his own personal possession, as Is his
private property, and is protected inviol-
able against false and defamatory
charges, Imputations and aspersions. His
fitness and qualifications may be can-
vassed, criticised and adjudged by the
members of the public upon the given
or proved facts and not upon defamatory
surmises, suspicions, aspersions and Im-
putations unwarranted by the given facts
even though such adverse opinions may
be honestly entertained. The protection
of the public Interest does not require
that he who holds an adverse opinion
concerning another should be accorded
full liberty or license for public expres-
sion thereof as for a fact, if it be only a
surmise or suspicion or unprovable per-
sonal Imputation, or opinion drawn from
unproved premises of fact.
The saying that fair and reasonable
comment and criticism upon the acts of
public officers is called "privileged" does
not mean that such criticism Is only sub-
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ject to the defense of privilege, or con-
ditional privilege, but only means that
it is within the scope of freedom per-
mitted by the law in making statements
upon truth and given fact and does not
extend to invented or merely supposed
fact and therefore to libel. Comment
upon or criticism of a public man upon
the acknowledged or proved facts of his
career is within the permissible scope,
but to say that one has been guilty of
particular acts of misconduct is trench-
ing upon the border of invention by the
speaker or writer, or is false, and in any
event unless justified by the truth of the
facts to be adduced In evidence, is defam-
atory in the eye of the law.
The defense of fair comment is in its
nature, and is so recognized, as a sep-
arate, several one for true comment alone
and is to be established as such by the
production of the basic facts into the
evidence for the purpose of showing that
the words charged are only fair comment
thereon or are criticism based upon such
established facts so as not to constitute
a libel. As such defense, fair comment
is one to be pleaded especially in proper
practice in Illinois.
The service, influence and power of the
press with the traditional and constitu-
tional rights of freedom of speech and
of the press is not to be minimized, cur-
tailed or hampered, yet that right is one
to be exercised only with due and proper
regard for the rights of the judiciary,
public officers, candidates for office, and
other public men and citizens to the pos-
session and protection of the right of
official integrity and of private character
undefamed.
When in the exercise of the constitu-
tional freedom of comment, an official
character or public man is made the sub-
ject of -criticism, the comment In ques-
tion must be based upon a proper foun-
dation stated in fact for the proper pre-
dicating of comment thereon, so that the
reader may himself make his Inferences
and draw 'his own conclusions as to the
fairness and reasonableness of the com-
ment thus publicly made. The making
or publishing of dogmatic statements
against a public man is in effect a denial
to the reader of an opportunity. to
reason upon the facts and thereby also a
denial to the subject of criticism of any
semblance of fairness in the inferences
thus stated against him or in the infer-
ences that might be drawn in his behalf
by impartial and discerning readers. Di-
rect assertion of fact implied in blunt
so-called comment, unfounded on given
or recognized premises of fact, is not
comment properly so considered, but is
publication by direct assertion of fact
and is not entitled to a defense as fair
comment at all since it is really not com-
ment. It would seem that the defense
allowed to a charge of libel against one
as for statements made In such direct
assertion of facts should only be that of
justification as on the ground of the
truth, and that only when published with
good motives and for justifiable ends.
When presented for determination Is
the question arising from publication of
a controverted article as to whether It
be fair comment or not, such issue Is a
matter of law for determination by the
court. The technical construction of the
article as to whether the bounds of fair
criticism have been passed or respected
is properly matter of law within the
province of the court. If the facts stated
therein require defense, as conceivably
they usually would, the defense of justi-
fication should be pleaded as to the facts
relied upon as a foundation, and a plea
of fair comment interposed as defense in
behalf of inferences based upon and
drawn from such foundational facts. The
character of comment on such facts as
stated will then be determined as to Its
appropriateness by the court. When the
court decides that the words charged are,
as a matter of law, statements of fact
and not comment, then as such they re-
quire the Justification of truth as defense.
The defendant may go unscathed in law
for fair comment that is only comment
permissibly drawn from correctly stated
premises of fact, but not for loose state-
ments unfounded by any stated and Justi-
fied premises of fact.
In proper procedure In a case the plan-
tiff has the burden of proving the publi-
cation of objectionable words. If the
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words are as a matter of law held libel-
ous per se, the burden redounds upon the
defendant to justify their truth, not as
fair comment but as statement of fact.
No burden attaches to the plantiff to
prove that the words are false. The pub-
lication has already injured him in his
revolted feelings, if not in his legal right.
It Is clearly the defendant's burden to
show that he has acted within his legal
right in publishing only the truth without
malice, with good motives and for justifi-
able ends. If the words charged are by
the court held to be statement of fact,
or in part statement of fact, and are
libelous In and of themselves, there is
then no ground upon which a defense of
fair comment as such can be based or
stand in the law.
And, finally: Upon a trial, after plain-
tiff has proved publication of objection-
able and defamatory words and special
damage resultant therefrom, the duty is
then devolved upon defendant to show
that the subject of comment is a matter
of public interest or importance upon
which he has correctly stated true foun-
dational facts as a basis for fair comment
made by him thereon. After such duty
has been performed by the defendant to
the establishment of his prima facie de-
fense, the duty is then cast upon the
plaintiff to show withal that malice in
fact has actuated the whole purpose or
course of the defendant in making the
publication complained of, and if there-
upon, malice in fact, or express malice,
upon the part of the defendant, be .by the
plaintiff proved, the defense of fair com-











Cases and Other Materials on Inter-
national Law. By Manley 0. Hudson,
St. Paul: West Publishing Company,
1929.
We find here the latest and by far the
best collection of cases on international
law. Dr. James Brown Scott who pub-
lished a collection of cases in 1902 and a
second edition in 1922, has placed at the
disposal of the editor the materials which
he had brought together. This book has
a great advantage over Dr. Scott's treat-
ise in not undertaking to deal with inter-
national law as a part of general sub-
stantive law, but on the contrary, treats
It as a sub-division of public law.
The decade since the end of the World
War has made an important contribution
to the materials which are open to the
use of students. Probably at no time
have there been so many difficult prob-
lems awaiting solutions. In consequence,
the boundaries of international law have
been much extended, and this collection
of cases is quite sufficient evidence of
that fact. Wherever possible, the editor
has included cases in which the tribunals
have applied the general law of nations,
and has distinguished them from those
cases which have been based upon the
theory of international law of a single
state.
The only criticism which may be made
upon the book is that there is nothing
like an adequate annotation of the peri-
odipal literature on the subject.
Corporate Meeting, Minutes, and Reso-
lutions. By Lillian Doris. New York:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1929.
The object of the writer in this case
is to explain to those who are responsible
for preparing the minutes of corporate
meetings, the elementary principles of
corporation law, a knowledge of which is
essential to a proper authorization of
corporate action.
The forms include such as are useful
in the case of stockholders' and directors'
meetings, proceedings upon the meeting
called for the purpose of organizing cor-
porations, resolutions concerning the
management of the corporation, issuance
